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Pooling Intellectual Capital:
Thoughts on Anonymity, Pseudonymity, and
Limited Liability in Cyberspace
David G. Postt
Crime on the Internet also presents the critical issue of
anonymity .... The development of secure, anonymous
electronic mail will greatly impair the ability of law en-
forcement to track terrorist communications. For exam-
ple, one Internet posting regarding the Oklahoma City
bombing and bomb construction was sent through an
"anonymous remailer"-a device designed to forward
electronic mail so that the original sender is un-
known-probably to prevent tracing.... Although prior
communication methods permit anonymous communica-
tions, those services generally provide one-to-one com-
munications. It would be both time-consuming and
costly to use either the phone or mail systems to dis-
seminate information wholesale, [which] effectively
prevent[s] wide-scale malicious use and limit[s] the
harm that can be caused. On the Internet, by contrast,
there are no monetary or technical impediments to
worldwide dissemination of communications. Anony-
mous, worldwide dissemination of terrorist information
must be of paramount concern to law enforcement and
to ordinary citizens.'
t Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, and Co-di-
rector, Cyberspace Law Institute. E-mail: Postd@law.georgetown.edu or david.post
@counsel.com. My thanks to David Johnson, Mark Lemley, Michael Froomkin, and the
pseudonymously named "Perry the Cynic," for comments on earlier formulations of the
ideas presented here, as well as to the participants on the Cyberia-L listserv generally for
their contributions to my thinking on these questions. As is customary, I bear all respon-
sibility for the manner in which those ideas are expressed.
Hearings on "Mayhem Manuals and the Internet" before the Subcommittee on
Terrorism, Technology and Government Information of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
1995 WL 293484 (FDCH) (May 11, 1995) (Testimony of Robert S. Litt, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Department of Justice, Criminal Division).
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Over the past year or two, the ease with which individuals
can communicate anonymously in cyberspace2 has begun to sink
into our collective consciousness.3 Enormous quantities of infor-
mation about the activities of anonymous remailers are now
freely available, 4 and discussions about the implications of wide-
spread anonymity have become commonplace in the popular
press5 as well as, increasingly, in scholarly literature.6 Calls for
2 I use the term "cyberspace" here to mean the global aggregate of digital, interac-
tive, electronic communication networks; cyberspace thus includes the constituent net-
works comprising the global internetwork (the "Internet"), as well as the Internet itself as
a separate, emergent phenomenon. A number of "technologies" are excluded intentionally
from this definition: for example, noninteractive media (current television-broadcasting
and cable-network systems), or nonnetworked computer applications (a videogame, for
example, or a computerized spreadsheet). Similarly, although one can imagine an analog
interactive network-indeed, one doesn't need to imagine such a network, for the world-
wide telephone network provides a good example-that, too, is not, for my purposes, part
of cyberspace. These exclusions are intentional; for reasons explored in more detail in
David R. Johnson and David Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace
(forthcoming, Stan L Rev) (1996) (unpublished manuscript on file with the University of
Chicago Legal Forum), this definition captures those distinctive characteristics of the new
'place" that, taken as a whole, have the most substantial effect on the applicable laws
governing conduct within the medium.
' Only a short while ago, Hardy, in his pioneering discussion of law in cyberspace,
could write that "[a]pparently anonymous remailer computers on the Internet exist in
Finland, for example," citing a personal conversation with Mike Godwin, counsel for the
Electronic Frontier Foundation. I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for
"Cyberspace", 55 U Pitt L Rev 993, 1011 n 45 (1994).
' A wealth of information about anonymous remailers can be found online at
http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/- rap h/re mailer-list. html;
http://www.cs.berkeley.ed u/ rap h/r email e r - FAQ. html.;
http://www.well.com/user/abacard/remail/html;
http://electron.rutgers.edu/-gambino/anon servers/anon.html/;
http'//chaos.taylored.com:1000/1/Anonymous-Mail. Information about one of the more
prominent remailers, the anon.penet.fi service, can be obtained by electronic mail at info
@anon.penet.fi. See, generally, A. Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information
Ocean: Living with Anonymity, Digital Cash, and Distributed Databases 7-12 (Paper
presented September 21, 1995, at the Conference for the Second Century of the University
of Pittsburgh School of Law) (unpublished manuscript on file with the University of
Chicago Legal Forum) (available online at http://www.law.miami.edu).
' See, for example, Charles Arthur, Pornographers on Internet Skilled at Covering
Tracks: Network Impossible to Censor, Independent 3 (July 27, 1995) (discussing the
.enormously difficult task" of tracking down pedophiles who "can use 'anonymous
remailers'--computers which receive messages and strip off the details of their sender,
before forwarding it elsewhere on the network"); Douglas Lavin, Anonymous Service an
Internet Loophole: As Governments Try to Limit Content, Global Resistance Grows, San
Diego Union-Tribune 7 (July 25, 1995) (discussing the anon.penet.fi anonymous remailer
service, the "electronic-publishing equivalent of offshore banking"); Chip Rowe, Censorship
Glossary: Pertaining to Computer Online Services, Playboy 48 (July 1995) (describing
anonymous remailers); Helen Nowicka, Innovations: Vice Squad Cleans up the Superhigh-
way, Daily Telegraph 16 (June 27, 1995) (describing discovery by West Midlands vice unit
that "[c]hild pornographers conceal their actions by sending encrypted images, or having
their electronic address removed by an anonymous remailer"); Charles Arthur, Super
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some form of state regulation of anonymity in cyberspace are on
the rise,7 and this, in turn, will prompt increased public debate
Informant Highway Set Up on the Internet: Police Open Route for Anonymous Electronic
Mail, Independent 7 (May 13, 1995) (describing initiative by police force to encourage
.anyone with information about crimes in the West Mercia [U.K.] area... to post elec-
tronic mail to the police" via anonymous remailer); Peter H. Lewis, Despite a New Plan
For Cooling It Off, Cybersex Stays Hot, NY Times 1-1, 1-34 (Mar 26, 1995) (describing the
difficulties of tracking down traffickers in pornographic material on the Internet because
users can "easily route their messages through so-called anonymous remailers who hide
their identities"); Editorial, The Electronic Poison Pen, Sacramento Bee F4 (Mar 12, 1995)
(describing potential for use of "anonymity servers" to foster criminal activity). See,
generally, David Post, Knock Knock, Who's There?, Am Lawyer 113 (Dec 1995).
6 See, for example, Ann Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability:
Challenges to the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 Yale L J 1639 (1995); Hardy, 55 U
Pitt L Rev at 1010-1012 (cited in note 3); Comment, Who Are You? Identity and Anonymi-
ty in Cyberspace, 55 U Pitt L Rev 1177 (1994); Curtis E. A. Karnow, The Encrypted Self
Fleshing Out the Rights of Electronic Personalities, 13 John Marshall J Computer & Info L
1 (1994); A. Michael Froomkin, Anonymity and Its Enmities, 1995 J Online L art 4
(http'./www.law.cornell.edu/jol/jol.table.html); Mark A. Lemley, Rights of Attribution and
Integrity in Online Communications, 1995 J Online L art 2
(http'J/www.law.cornell.edu/jol/jol.table.html); Froomkin, Flood Control (cited in note 4).
' Opening the Senate hearings on "Mayhem Manuals and the Internet," Senator
Arlen Specter remarked:
Among those who communicate on the Internet are purveyors of hate and vio-
lence. Among the full text offerings on the Internet are detailed instruction
books describing how to manufacture a bomb. The most widely known manual is
the "Big Book of Mischief." This 93-page document details explosives formulas,
how to purchase explosives and propellants, and how to use them.... Anyone
with access to the Internet can obtain this recipe for disaster, even a 10-year-old
child who can find a glass container and some gasoline.... There are also
electronic mail discussion groups where information on bomb making can be
traded anonymously. One disgusting example is this anonymous message posted
on an Internet electronic bulletin board shortly after the Oklahoma City bomb-
ing: "Are you interested in receiving information detailing the components and
materials needed to construct a bomb identical to the one used in Oklahoma?
The information specifically details the construction, deployment, and detona-
tion of high powered explosives. It also includes complete details of the bomb
used in Oklahoma City, and how it was used and how it could have been bet-
ter." The individual who posted this message, who cowers in anonymity, de-
serves condemnation for using the Internet to suggest how the Oklahoma City
bombing "could have been better." This is just one of many other examples....
Among the issues before us are the extent of such usage of the Internet and
whether anything can or should be done to curb it.
Hearings on "Mayhem Manuals and the Internet," 1995 WL 311682 (FDCH) (statement of
Senator Arlen Specter) (cited in note 1).
Similarly, Section 502 of the recently enacted Telecommunications Act of 1996,
amending 47 USC § 233, makes it a federal crime for anyone to "utilize[ ] a telecommuni-
cations device, whether or not conversation or communication ensues, without disclosing
his identity and with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person at the called
number or who receives the communications." Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub
L No 104-104, 110 Stat 56 (1996), to be codified at 47 USC § 223 (emphasis added).
1391
142 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1996:
about the costs and benefits associated with anonymous commu-
nication.
At least in the rather unusual circumstances of cyberspace,
that debate must pay particularly close attention to anonymity's
close cousin, pseudonymity. On the one hand, it will be difficult,
and at times impossible, to distinguish pseudonymous and anony-
mous messages from one another; as a result, attempts to restrict
or eliminate anonymous speech will a fortiori have an effect,
intended or otherwise, on the availability of pseudonymous
messaging as well. The costs and benefits associated with
pseudonymity must therefore be part of the overall equation for
assessing the wisdom of alternative schemes for regulating anon-
ymous speech. But the benefits of pseudonymous speech may be
quite far-ranging and quite distinct from the benefits normally
associated with anonymous-messaging systems. Pseudonymous
speech is valuable in a way that anonymous speech is not and
cannot be, because it permits the accumulation of reputational
capital and "goodwill" over time in the pseudonym itself, while
simultaneously serving as a liablity limitation insulating the
speaker's "true identity" from exposure. Using liability limita-
tions as a mechanisim to foster a particular goal-the formation
of collective enterprises capable of accumulating reputational
capital-is a device familiar from the corporate law context, and
it is my contention that pseudonymous speech is capable of play-
ing a similar role in cyberspace. The debate over the proper scope
of anonymity regulation therefore needs to be broadened to take
this feature of pseudonymous speech expressly into account.
I. ANONYMITY AND THE LAW
The framework for the anonymity debate appears reasonably
well settled. On the cost side of the ledger, anonymous messaging
makes it impossible for "law enforcement"-broadly defined to
include both public and private enforcement mechanisms-to
obtain information about, and thus pursue legal action against,
the person or persons responsible for harmful behavior. There is
also the attendant moral-hazard problem: to the extent individu-
als can avoid internalizing the costs that their behavior imposes
on others, widespread anonymity may increase the aggregate
amount of harmful behavior itself.8
See, for example, Ann Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability:
Challenges to the First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 Yale L J 1639, 1642 (1995) (cited in
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On the benefit side of the balance, as the Supreme Court
noted some time ago, "[ilt is plain that anonymity has sometimes
been assumed for the most constructive purposes." There are
perfectly legitimate-laudable, even-reasons why individuals
might want to engage in communicative activity without disclos-
ing their identities, and profound public benefit that may be
derived from allowing them to do so. By permitting individuals to
communicate without fear of compromising their personal privacy
and without fear of retribution, anonymity permits information to
be injected into public discourse that might otherwise remain
undisclosed-information about the views of political dissenters,
for example, or "whistleblower" information that may help un-
cover the existence of illegal activity.1 °
note 6) ("[Tlhere are.., many valid reasons supporting prohibition of anonymity. Disguis-
ing the sources of messages or postings relieves their authors from responsibility for any
harm that may ensue. This often encourages outrageous behavior without any opportunity
for recourse to the law for redress of grievances. Law enforcement officials or lawyers
seeking to file a civil suit might not be able to identify an individual to hold responsible.");
Comment, Who are You? Identity and Anonymity in Cyberspace, 55 U Pitt L Rev 1177,
1179 (1994) (cited in note 6) (noting the argument that "anonymity will allow a user to
hide behind a number, rather than a name, and will discourage users from taking respon-
sibility for their own communications," thus "effectively encourag[ing] the posting of
illegal and abusive messages to the Net") (internal footnote omitted); A. Michael
Froomkin, Anonymity and Its Enmities, 1995 J Online L art 4, 44-52 (cited in note 6)
(discussing the "dark side of anonymity" and the various "unsavory possibilities" under an
anonymous messaging system). Justice Scalia, dissenting in McIntyre v Ohio Elections
Commission, 115 S Ct 1511, 1537 (1995), summarized this case against anonymous
speech: "I can imagine no reason why an anonymous leaflet is any more honorable, as a
general matter, than an anonymous phone call or an anonymous letter. It facilitates
wrong by eliminating accountability, which is ordinarily the very purpose of the anonymi-
ty."
Tally v California, 362 US 60, 65 (1960).
10 See, for example, Branscomb, 104 Yale L J at 1642 (cited in note 6) ("There are
numerous situations in which anonymity seems entirely appropriate and even desirable.
Psychologists and sociologists point out that people benefit from being able to assume dif-
ferent personae. It is therefore natural that individuals use electronic communication to
disguise themselves, as in costume balls in the multiuser dungeons (MUDs) that Howard
Rheingold describes.... The media often cite 'a prominent source' who does not wish to
be identified, and pseudonymous authors have long been with us, sometimes in the past
to prevent disclosure that the writer was female for fear her work would not be published
were her gender known.... Anonymity has also been protected in cases in which actual
retaliation or harm may ensue if the source of the writing is known, as in the case of
whistle-blowers or political dissidents under authoritarian regimes.") (citing Howard
Rheingold, The Virtual Community 145-50 (Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1993));
Froomkin, Flood Control at 23 (cited in note 4) ("[Alnonymous electronic communication
greatly enhances the privacy of the author. This is a good to the extent that privacy itself
is a good, and while privacy may be a good, it is not wholly good or costless."); Comment,
55 U Pitt L Rev at 1178 (cited in note 6) ("Abused as a child, an adult decides to share his
story with a support group. A young woman who has tested positive for HIV discusses her
feelings with others affected by the AIDS virus. After observing illegal activities at his
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This framework is undoubtedly a useful one, and these con-
siderations are indeed necessary ingredients of any discussion
about regulating anonymity in cyberspace. I do not intend my
discussion to replace, or to repeat, this analysis. Instead, I want
to inject a new set of concerns into this ongoing debate. I want to
suggest that an analysis of anonymity in the rather unusual
circumstances of cyberspace brings a new suite of costs and bene-
fits into play that have, perhaps, received little attention up to
now (at least in this context), and that therefore the existing
analytical framework must expand to take these concerns into
account.
New approaches to the problem of anonymity in cyberspace
will certainly be needed if only because there is not really any
existing law regarding truly anonymous communications or
transactions, for the simple reason that such communications or
transactions are, by definition-because the responsible party is
unknown-beyond the reach of ordinary legal processes. Consid-
er, by way of illustration, the facts in McIntyre v Ohio Elections
Commission,11 the Supreme Court's most recent brush with the
legal issues surrounding the regulation of "anonymous" communi-
cation. Mrs. McIntyre distributed leaflets to persons attending a
public meeting at the Blendon Middle School in Westerville,
Ohio, expressing opposition to a proposed school tax levy. Some
of the leaflets she distributed identified her as the author; others
merely indicated that they expressed the views of "Concerned
Parents and Taxpayers."12 The Ohio Elections Committee fined
Mrs. McIntyre one hundred dollars for violating the relevant
statute, which provided that:
No person shall write, print, post, or distribute, or cause
to be written, printed, posted, or distributed, a notice,
placard, dodger, advertisement, sample ballot, or any
other form of general publication which is designed
to ... promote the adoption or defeat of any issue...
through flyers, handbills, or other nonperiodical printed
matter, unless there appears on such form of publication
company, a man debates the implications of 'blowing the whistle' on his employer. A
dissident in China publishes some of his banned writings. For privacy reasons, all four
individuals wish to remain anonymous. These scenarios would not be unique in today's
society, except that they are occurring daily over an extensive computer network known
as the Internet.").
1 115 S Ct 1511 (1995).
12 Id at 1514.
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in a conspicuous place or is contained within said state-
ment the name and residence or business address of the
chairman, treasurer, or secretary of the organization
issuing the same, or the person who issues, makes, or is
responsible therefor."3
The Court described the issue in the case as "whether an
Ohio statute that prohibits the distribution of anonymous cam-
paign literature is a 'law... abridging the freedom of speech'
within the meaning of the First Amendment."'4 In the course of
its opinion, the Court discussed-at times eloquently-the "im-
portant role in the progress of mankind" that "[alnonymous pam-
phlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played:" 5
Anonymity. . provides a way for a writer who may be
personally unpopular to ensure that readers will not
prejudge her message simply because they do not like
its proponent. Thus, even in the field of political rheto-
ric, where the identity of the speaker is an important
component of many attempts to persuade, the most
effective advocates have sometimes opted for anonymi-
ty. [There is] a respected tradition of anonymity in the
advocacy of political causes. This tradition is perhaps
best exemplified by the secret ballot, the hard-won right
to vote one's conscience without fear of retaliation.
1 6
The Court concluded:
Under our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is
not a pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an honorable
tradition of advocacy and of dissent. Anonymity is a
shield from the tyranny of the majority. It thus exempli-
fies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the
First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular
individuals from retaliation-and their ideas from sup-
pression-at the hand of an intolerant society. The right
to remain anonymous may be abused when it shields
fraudulent conduct. But political speech by its nature
will sometimes have unpalatable consequences, and, in
" Ohio Rev Code Ann § 53599.09(A) (Banks-Baldwin, 1988), excerpted in McIntyre,
115 S Ct at 1514-15 n 3 (emphasis added).
McIntyre, 115 S Ct at 1514.
Id at 1516 (quoting Talley, 362 US at 64).
16 McIntyre, 115 S Ct at 1517 (internal quotations and footnotes omitted).
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general, our society accords greater weight to the value
of free speech than to the dangers of its misuse. Ohio
has not shown that its interest in preventing the mis-
use of anonymous election-related speech justifies a
prohibition of all uses of that speech. 7
But in what sense was "anonymity" the issue in this case?
The Ohio statute indeed "prohibit[ed] the distribution of anony-
mous campaign literature." 8 The actions that led to Mrs.
McIntyre's punishment, however, were not anonymous at
all-she went to a meeting of her neighbors and, acting in a
manner such that her identity was evident to all, distributed a
certain category of campaign literature; that is, literature with-
out printed identification. There were, on reflection, two elements
to the offense with which Mrs. McIntyre was charged: (1) anony-
mous communication (through a "notice, placard, dodger, adver-
tisement, sample ballot, or any other form of general publication
which is designed to ... promote the adoption or defeat of any
issue" 9); and (2) some nonanonymous action sufficient to allow
her to be identified and charged with the offense. Both were
required elements, but only with respect to the first did the Ohio
legislature make a choice; the second is a consequence of a more
fundamental requirement that rules can only be enforced by
identifying some party against whom to proceed.
Both the presence and the absence of anonymity were thus
necessary preconditions to enforcement of the Ohio statute. This
is a bit odd, but it is little more than a theoretical oddity in a
world-such as the one the Ohio legislators surely had in
mind-where perfect anonymity is difficult to achieve and where
the absence of perfect anonymity can, generally speaking, be
counted, on to resolve the enforcement dilemma.2 ° But
cyberspace is not such a world.
Id at 1524 (citations omitted).
" Ohio Rev Code Ann § 599.09(A)(Banks-Baldwin, 1988), excerpted in McIntyre, 115
S Ct at 1514-15 n 3.
19 Id.
20 In the nonvirtual world, to have achieved truly anonymous action Mrs. McIntyre
would have had to go to considerable trouble and expense. At the very least, she would
have required her own printer or photocopying machine (to avoid using the local photo-
copying supplier, who could identify her after the fact), and she would have needed to
arrange for some form of distribution other than passing out handbills at a public meet-
ing. Compare McIntyre, 115 S Ct at 1522 (noting that the case "demonstrates [that] the
absence of the author's name on a document does not necessarily protect either that
person or a distributor of a forbidden document from being held responsible for com-
pliance with the election code").
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Thanks in large part to the easy availability of powerful
cryptographic tools, the Internet provides the ability to
send anonymous electronic messages at will....
[Alnonymously remailed email cannot, if properly imple-
mented, be traced to its sender. In addition, two or more
persons can communicate without knowing each other's
identity, while preserving the "untraceable" nature of
their communications.21
In cyberspace, a law prohibiting anonymous literature is not only
of questionable constitutionality; it verges on incoherence. If
Ohio, or any other jurisdiction, seriously wants to prohibit such
communications, something other than a law declaring it illegal
to communicate anonymously will be required, for in cyberspace
we can no longer overlook the fact that perfect anonymity fatally
challenges the enforceability of any laws prohibiting perfect ano-
nymity."
In a sense, there can be no more significant question regard-
ing the structure of a legal system than that regarding the con-
trol of anonymous speech and anonymous conduct, for true ano-
nymity goes to the heart of any attempt to impose the rule of law
on any set of activities. But there is no well-developed and self-
contained "jurisprudence of anonymity" in the nonvirtual world,
because the scope for anonymous action is relatively limited; it
would be hard to argue, for example, that the Supreme Court's
21 Froomkin, Flood Control at 7 (cited in note 4) (emphasis added). Froomkin pro-
vides an excellent primer on the ways in which a combination of strong cryptography and
the existence of "anonymous remailers-mail services that "delete all the identifying
information about incoming e-mails, [and] substitute a predefined header identifying the
remailer as the sender or using a cute tag such as nobody@nowhere"-enable users to
achieve virtually unbreakable anonymity. Id at 8-15. See also note 6.
' This is not to say that the availability of anonymous communication in cyberspace
cannot be regulated in any fashion. The decentralized architecture of cyberspace and the
difficulties of applying physically based notions of personal jurisdiction in an environment
in which physical boundaries are difficult, if not impossible, to identify, may make direct
enforcement of legal norms against individual violators more difficult once the means to
accomplish such violation is widely disseminated. But as Perritt has noted, this decen-
tralization "naturally shift[s] victim attention to intermediaries who are more likely to be
readily identifiable, subject to the jurisdiction of traditional legal institutions, and finan-
cially able to pay compensation for injury." Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Computer Crimes and
Torts in the Global Information Infrastructure: Intermediaries and Jurisdiction (Paper
presented at the University of Oslo, Oct 12, 1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with
the University of Chicago Legal Forum). See also Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and
Social Dialogue on the Information Superhighway: the Case Against Copyright Liability of
Bulletin Board Operators, 13 Cardozo Arts & Enter L J 345, 399-411 (1995), for a particu-
larly enlightening discussion of the relationship between decentralized systems and inter-
mediary liability.
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reasoning in McIntyre v Ohio Elections Commission is in any way
central to an understanding of the American legal system. But in
cyberspace, one can hardly imagine a legal question-from copy-
right infringement to the design of electronic banking and cur-
rency systems, from the regulation of obscene or indecent speech
to the enforcement of libel law-that is not affected by questions
regarding the scope and availablilty of anonymous communica-
tions.
If we are going to create a jurisprudence capable of reflecting
intelligently on the new questions posed by the phenomenon of
true anonymity, we will need to draw on learning from an expan-
sive array of what previously have been scattered subdisci-
plines.23 Privacy law and the law of free expression come imme-
diately to mind, and undoubtedly will have a significant role to
play in this formulation. My suggestion here is simply that prin-
ciples of great value for these purposes exist in another corner of
the law that might not seem so obviously relevant, namely, cor-
poration law. In order to see why this may be the case, however,
a definitional detour is required to focus more clearly on the
precise nature of the phenomenon in question here.
II. A DEFINITIONAL FRAMEWORK
Discussion of these questions requires, first, that we more
carefully delineate the distinctions among three related concepts:
anonymity, pseudonymity, and traceability.24 We begin with the
notion that from the contents of a message the recipient may
obtain information-a reduction in uncertainty 5---concerning
Katsh has insightfully discussed the way in which the developing law of cyberspace
requires analysis that cuts across otherwise separate legal subdisciplines. Ethan Katsh,
Law in a Digital World (Oxford University Press, 1995). I have elsewhere suggested that
this broadened framework may be an example of a more general phenomenon brought on
by the legal profession's decreasing dependence on an information-retrieval system
(West's American Digests) which requires placing all identifiable propositions of law into
predefined, and relatively static, categories. See David Post, The Law is Where You Find
It, Am Lawyer 98 (Mar 1996). See also Robert C. Berring, Collapse of the Structure of the
Legal Research Universe: The Imperative of Digital Information, 69 Wash L Rev 9 (1994);
Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and Legal Concepts: Where Form Molds Substance, 75
Cal L Rev 15 (1987).
4 This framework expands upon the one first proposed by Froomkin. See A. Michael
Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information Ocean: Living with Anonymity, Digital Cash,
and Distributed Databases 7-12 (Paper presented September 21, 1995 at the Conference
for the Second Century of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law) (unpublished
manuscript on file with the University of Chicago Legal Forum) (available online at
http//www.law.miami.edu) (cited in note 4).
' "Information" is used here in the information-theoretical sense, in which it is de-
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the identity of the originator of the message. An "anonymous
message" can be defined as a message that provides the recipient
with no information-no reduction in uncertainty postreceipt
when measured against the prereceipt baseline---concerning the
identity of the message originator. This is a relatively straightfor-
ward and presumably noncontroversial definition; if I am no less
uncertain about the identity of the message originator after I
receive the message than I was before, the message is an anony-
mous one.
26
The degree to which a message can be considered anonymous
cannot, however, always be determined solely with reference to
the text of the message; it may require access to extratextual
information about message context. Imagine, for example, that
each of one hundred people receives the identical letter identified
only as having been sent by "your friend." Have they received an
anonymous message? Some recipients certainly have-those who
look at the identifying information and can extract nothing useful
from it. 27 For others, that particular string of characters may be
quite meaningful; they may know some individual who frequently
communicates with them in this precise way, and the message is
therefore to them not anonymous at all.
fined as a "reduction in uncertainty" attributable to a particular message. Amiel
Feinstein, Foundations of Information Theory 1-3 (McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1958).
Applied to the question at hand, an anonymous message is one in which the uncer-
tainty (regarding the identity of the sender of the message) before the message is received
is equal to the uncertainty after the message is received; in that case, we can say that the
message contains no information about identity inasmuch as there has been no reduction
in uncertainty achieved by receipt of the message. See, generally, Claude E. Shannon and
Warren Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of Communication 18-26 (The University of
Illinois Press, 1949); Marud Mansuripur, Introduction to Information Theory 1-4, 11-22
(Prentice-Hall, 1987).
2 A qualification of this definition might be helpful. One can certainly imagine truly
anonymous messages in this strict sense: messages containing no information whatsoever
about the originator of the message. However, it is probably more constructive to think of
anonymity as a continuous, rather than a binary, attribute of messages; after all, even
messages we ordinarily think of as "anonymous" contain some information about the
author. For example, graffiti scrawled on a subway platform informs us that the author
was literate and was physically present on that particular platform at some point during
the period since the platform was last painted, all of which significantly reduces our
uncertainty about the author's identity by ruling out the vast majority of individuals in
the world as possible authors. In order to talk constructively about anonymous messages,
we can think of there being some threshold of uncertainty-reduction, and define an
anonymous message as one in which the amount of information regarding the originator
of the message falls below this threshold.
2" More precisely, to those recipients the string of characters "your friend" conveys no
uncertainty-reducing information at all. See note 25.
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Moreover, the amount of identifying information contained in
a message is rarely a fixed quantity; relevant information may
often be available, but only at some additional cost or effort. This
letter from "your friend" may be anonymous when I receive it,
but there may be ways that I can obtain additional information
that narrows down the list of potential originators. It may, for
example, be covered with fingerprints from which, were I able
easily to access both a fingerprint reader and a comprehensive
database of fingerprints, I could obtain significant information
about likely originators.
We can define a second variable--"traceability"-to measure
the ease with which additional information of this kind about the
identity of the sender can be obtained. Traceability, like anonym-
ity, is highly context-dependent; the cost of obtaining a given
amount of additional identification information will vary, possibly
greatly, from one situation to another. In the example above, the
traceability of the message is technology-dependent; that is,
traceability will vary depending on whether the fingerprint read-
er and database are available to the recipient. More commonly,
relevant identification information may exist in the hands of
third parties (parties other than the originator and recipient). If
instead of a letter I receive an anonymous e-mail bearing the
return address "yourfriend@someplace.org," I may be able to
obtain information about the location of the "someplace.org" do-
main and the identity of the owner,28 who may be able to reveal
the name and address of the individual to whom the "yourfriend"
ID was assigned. In the case of e-mail arriving from an anony-
28 The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) is responsible for the overall
coordination and management of the Internet Domain Name system. See Jon Postel,
Domain Name System Structure and Delegation RFC 1591 (Mar 1994) (available'online at
http'//www.internic.net/rfc/rfcl591.txt). See also A. Cooper & J. Postel, The US Domain,
RFC 1480 (June 1993) (availible online at http:/www.internic.net/rfc/rfc1480.text). LANA
has delegated the administration of IP address registrations to the InterNIC Registration
Service, which in turn has contracted for the provision of administration services with a
private firm, Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI"), which maintains a database of the names of
the administrators of each registered machine. See Postel at Section 3; A. Rutkowski,
Generic International and Domestic Institutional Considerations for DNS Naming and
Number Administration, http'//www.internic.net/internet-drafts/draft-rutkowski-dns-role-
00.txt (Nov 1995). See, generally, Dan L. Burk, Trademarks Along the Infobahn: A First
Look at the Emerging Law of Cybermarks, 1 U Richmond J L & Tech 1 (1995) (availible
online at http://www.urich.edu/-jolt/vlil/burk.html) (describing generally the Domain
Naming System). See also P. Mockapetris, Domain Names-Concepts and Facilities, RFC
882 (Nove 1983) (availible online at ftpJ/ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc882.txt); P. Mockapetris,
Domain Names-Implementation and Specifications, RFC 883 (Nov 1983) (availible online
at ftp'J/ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc883.txt).
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mous remailer, the owner of the remailer may retain the iden-
tification information that was present in the incoming mes-
sage.29 Where this is the case, the traceability of a message may
be largely a function of the remailer's duty (or lack of a duty) to
keep the information secret and the ease with which disclosure
can be legally compelled (by process, subpoena, warrant, or oth-
erwise). It may be relatively easy for a law enforcement official to
obtain the name and address of the individual who has been as-
signed the "yourfriend" ID, while the same information may be
extremely difficult and costly for other individuals (including the
recipient) to obtain.3 °
One final complication will complete this definitional frame-
work: pseudonymity. Assume for the moment a context in which
these letters (or e-mail messages) are untraceably anonymous, as
defined above. Assume further that you receive a series of such
letters or e-mails, all bearing the same signature (electronic or
otherwise). Over time, it becomes less and less constructive to
think of these messages as merely anonymous, even though you
may come no closer to identifying the actual, biological individu-
als responsible for them. As you come to associate certain charac-
teristics with the fictional entity associated with the identifier
"your friend"-grammar, spelling, style, forcefulness of rhetoric,
reasonableness of argument, and so on-it becomes increasingly
useful to recognize that "your friend," whoever or whatever it
may be, is the message originator. "Your friend," in short, has
become a pseudonym.
' This phenomenon was most clearly illustrated in February 1995, when officials of
the Church of Scientology engaged in a series of disputes with individuals who had been
using the anon.penet.fi anonymous remailer to post documents to the
alt.religion.scientology Usenet group. According to the Church, these documents contained
copyrighted and trade-secret information. The Church enlisted the aid of the Finnish
police and obtained a warrant for a search of the anon.penet.fi database. See A. Michael
Froomkin, Anonymity and Its Enmities, 1995 J Online L art 4, 91 40
(http'//www.law.cornell.edujol/jol.table.html) (cited in note 6); David Post, The First
Internet War: Scientology, its Critics, Anarchy, and Law in Cyberspace, Reason 28 (Apr
1996). Information on this incident is also available at
httpJ/www.cybercom.net/-rnewman/scientology/home.html#PENET.
o As a general matter, information about the identity of the author(s) of an e-mail
message does not appear to be protected under U.S. law. While the Electronic Communi-
cations Privacy Act, 18 USC §§ 2510 et seq (1994), prohibits (with certain exceptions) the
disclosure of "the contents of any ... electronic communication," 18 USC §§ 2511(c),
2511(e)(i), the statute does not similarly protect the name or address of the originator of
the message. Accordingly, it does not appear that third party system operators or ad-
ministrators have a statutory duty to disclose, or to refrain from disclosing, such informa-
tion.
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The above simple example makes clear that the distinction
between anonymous and pseudonymous messages is a subtle one.
The first time that a novel was published under the name "Mark
Twain," one appropriately may have considered this an "anony-
mous" text, the equivalent of publication under the name "Anon."
I obtain no more information about the identity of the
"true"-biological-author of the book in the former case than in
the latter. Why then is "Mark Twain" considered a pseudonym
while "Anon." is not? The answer, of course, is that just as with
"your friend," over time the identifier "Mark Twain" came to be
associated with a distinct set of characteristics that may be con-
sidered assets--"reputational capital"-of the pseudonym itself.
Without these associations there is indeed no meaningful differ-
ence between anonymity and pseudonymity; had Samuel Clem-
ens chosen to publish each of his novels under a different pseud-
onym, that would have been essentially equivalent to publishing
all of his novels under the single pseudonym "Anon." or "John
Doe." But by the time The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn was
published, we could no longer say that the designation of "Mark
Twain" as the author gave us no information about the originator
of the text; the originator of the text is the fictional entity Mark
Twain.
Let me propose the following working definition: a "pseudon-
ymous message" is (a) a message that is anonymous (in the sense
that it provides no information concerning the identity of the
biological individual or individuals responsible for prepararing or
transmitting the message), but that (b) contains some informa-
tion about the identity of some cognizable entity that is the origi-
nator of the message.
III. ANONYMITY AND PSEUDONYMITY IN CYBERSPACE
What light can this framework shed on the question of
whether, or how best, to regulate the availability and use of
anonymous messaging in cyberspace? In order to focus this dis-
cussion in a concrete way, let me start by setting up something of
a straw man: assume that the Ohio legislature were to attempt
to ban anonymity in cyberspace by passing a statute with a dis-
closure provision identical to the one at issue in McIntyre v Ohio
Elections Commission,3' but applicable only to electronic
communications. This law would require that all computer-medi-
"' 115 S Ct 1511 (1995).
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ated electronic communications disclose the "name and residence
or business address of the chairman, treasurer, or secretary of
the organization issuing" the communication, or the name and
residence of the "person who issues, makes, or is responsible" for
it. 32
An assumption may help to focus attention on some of the
less obvious consequences of this disclosure requirement. In
McIntyre, Justice Ginsburg left open the possibilty that the dis-
closure requirement struck down in that specific context might be
constitutionally permissible elsewhere:
The Court's decision finds unnecessary, overintrusive,
and inconsistent with American ideals the State's impo-
sition of a fine on an individual leafleteer who, within
her local community, spoke her mind, but sometimes
not her name. We do not thereby hold that the State
may not in other, larger circumstances, require the
speaker to disclose its interest by disclosing its identi-
ty.3
3
Assume that cyberspace is one of those "larger circumstances."
That is, assume that the harms flowing from the easy availability
of truly anonymous messaging in cyberspace-the ability to freely
discuss terrorist tactics, or the comparative effectiveness of bomb-
making formulas, etc., on the Internet without fear of any law
enforcement interference-have so substantially increased that
they are precisely equal to the benefits flowing from such speech.
This assumption is unlikely to be correct. It enables us, how-
ever, to disaggregate the effects of this hypothetical statute on
truly anonymous speech from its effects on pseudonymous speech
by imagining a context in which the cost-benefit balance is in
equipoise in regard to truly anonymous communication, and then
asking: what other costs and benefits might be associated with
this statutory disclosure provision?34
' The scope of Ohio's jurisdiction to impose this hypothetical statutory scheme is an
important and complex question. See Henry H. Perritt, Jurisdiction in Cyberspace (Paper
presented at Villanova Law Review Symposium, Oct 28, 1995) (unpublished draft on file
with the University of Chicago Legal Forum). Also important is the question of how any
such rule would be enforced against violators in cyberspace. Any comprehensive attempt
to analyze the consequences of this statute would need to address these questions, but I
will not do so here, in order to focus attention on a different set of issues.
'3 McIntyre, 115 S Ct at 1524 (Ginsburg concurring).
Note that I am not asking precisely the same question the Court in McIntyre asked
with reference to the real-world equivalent of this statute, namely, whether it complies
with the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. See McIntyre, 115 S Ct at 1514.
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Note first that, at least under my definitions, pseudonymity
is a subset of anonymity: a pseudonymous message is an anony-
mous message, containing no information about the "actual"
identity of the message originator (although a pseudonymous
message does contain certain other identifying information). That
being the case, eliminating the entire category of anonymous
messages-"banning anonymity"-effectively eliminates all
pseudonymous messages as well.
Even regulations falling short of a total ban on anonymous
messaging are likely to eliminate pseudonymity to the same
extent they eliminate anonymity. The reason is that it is difficult
to distinguish between these two subsets of anonymous messag-
es-what I call "truly anonymous" (that is, nonpseudonymous)
and pseudonymous messages-because the distinction between
them is, as noted above, necessarily context-dependent. Charac-
terization of a message as falling within one or the other of these
categories can rarely be accomplished solely with reference to the
message text itself. As in the examples above, we may only be
able to determine whether an electronic-mail message from "your
friend" or "Mark Twain" is pseudonymous from the historical
context in which the message is embedded, the process by which
strings of characters have, or have not, become associated with
particular identifying characteristics. It is unlikely that sufficient
information about context can be captured by any rule that at-
tempts to regulate the transmission of anonymous messages; this
contextual information is likely to be invisible to anyone monitor-
ing message content. Therefore, any such rule will be unlikely to
distinguish between truly anonymous and pseudonymous mes-
sages, and correspondingly likely to sweep all forms of
pseudonymity into its enforcement web as well.
The McIntyre Court implicitly recognized this principle that
restrictions on anonymity necessarily restrict pseudonymity as
well. The Court made frequent reference to the Federalist Pa-
pers5 and other pseudonymously published material in support
Whether this hypothetical statute is constitutional as applied to electronic communica-
tions is of course an important question. But for reasons examined in detail elsewhere,
see David R. Johnson and David Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,
(forthcoming Stan L Rev) (1996) (unpublished manuscript on file with the University of
Chicago Legal Forum) (cited in note 2), and reasonably well summarized by the aphorism
that "the First Amendment is a local ordinance in cyberspace," I prefer, in the global
context of cyberspace, to direct my attention to the underlying policy question of the
wisdom of such a scheme rather than its compliance with any particular set of "local"
standards.
"' McIntyre, 115 S Ct at 1517 n 6.
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of its analysis of the benefits that society derives from anony-
mous communication.3 ' The Court observed that the "respected
tradition of anonymity in the advocacy of political causes" is
"most famously embodied in the Federalist Papers, authored by
James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, but signed
'Publius,'"37 and Justice Thomas noted that the Federalist Pa-
pers are "only the most famous example of the outpouring of
anonymous political writing that occurred during the ratification
of the Constitution." s3  I have no doubt that the Justices of the
Supreme Court are capable of distinguishing between anonymous
and pseudonymous communication should the need arise; but in
regard to this statute the need did not arise precisely because the
statute had identical effects on both forms of communication.
Anyone found distributing the pseudonymously published Feder-
alist Papers in Ohio (including, but not limited to, Messrs. Madi-
son, Hamilton, or Jay) would have suffered the same fate as Mrs.
McIntyre. As a result, the Court correctly took into account the
costs of suppressing socially valuable pseudonymous works when
evaluating Ohio's prohibition on anonymous communication, and
concluded, in effect, that the aggregate social costs of eliminating
both forms of speech were not outweighed by the State's asserted
interests.39
The Federalist Papers, of course, are within the subset of anonymous works that
can be considered pseudonymously published; the "true identity" of the authors is not
revealed in the communications themselves, but the entity responsible for -author-
ship-"Publius'-is conspicuously communicated. See, for example, Federalist 9
(Hamilton), in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers 71, 76 (Mentor, 1961).
37 McIntyre, 115 S Ct at 1517 n 6.
' Id at 1526 (Thomas concurring). The majority observed that:
Publius's opponents, the Anti-Federalists, also tended to publish under pseud-
onyms: prominent among them were "Cato," believed to be New York Governor
George Clinton; "Centinel," probably Samuel Bryan or his father, Pennsylvania
judge and legislator George Bryan; "The Federal Farmer," who may have been
Richard Henry Lee, a Virginia member of the Continental Congress and a signer
of the Declaration of Independence; and "Brutus," who may have been Robert
Yates, a New York Supreme Court justice who walked out on the Constitutional
Convention. A forerunner of all of these writers was the pre-Revolutionary War
English pamphleteer "Junius," whose true identity remains a mystery.
Id at 1517 n 6 (citations omitted). See also Talley v California, 362 US 61, 65 (1960)
("Even the Federalist Papers, written in favor of the adoption of our Constitution, were
published under fictitious names. It is plain that anonymity has sometimes been assumed
for the most constructive purposes.").
' McIntyre, 115 S Ct at 1520-22 (discussing the two state interests proffered by Ohio
in support of this statutory provision: the "interest in providing the electorate with rele-
vant information" and in "preventing fraudulent and libelous statements").
156 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1996:
Is it so obvious that the Ohio statute would have banned
distribution of the Federalist Papers? Recall the relevant statuto-
ry language:
No person shall write, print, post, or distribute, or cause
to be written, printed, posted, or distributed, a notice,
placard, dodger, advertisement, sample ballot, or any
other form of general publication which is designed
to . . . promote the adoption or defeat of any issue,...
through flyers, handbills, or other nonperiodical printed
matter, unless there appears on such form of publica-
tion in a conspicuous place or is contained within said
statement the name and residence or business address
of the chairman, treasurer, or secretary of the organiza-
tion issuing the same, or the person who issues, makes,
or is responsible therefor.4 °
Clearly, the Federalist Papers do not comply with the statutory
disclosure requirements: no "name and residence or business
address" is set forth in that publication. But notice that the
pseudonymous author ("Publius") could not have complied with
this disclosure requirement. Even if "Publius" were a "person"
within the meaning of the statute, it had no "residence or busi-
ness address," and if it were deemed not a "person" but an "orga-
nization issuing the communication," it had (as far as we know)
no "chairman, treasurer, or secretary" whose name could be dis-
closed.
"Publius," in other words, was not the kind of entity permit-
ted by the Ohio authorities to engage in this form of public dis-
course, for the Ohio statute explicitly required that communica-
tions come exclusively either from "persons," or from "organiza-
tions" that have a particular structure (namely, that have an
identifiable "chairman, treasurer, or secretary").41 By calling for
the disclosure of certain information, the statute implicitly re-
quired that the information exist; if the information did not exist,
the statutory requirements could not be complied with. Although
the statute ostensibly regulated only the disclosure of certain
information, it was in fact regulating the kinds of entities that
40 Ohio Rev Code Ann § 3599.09(A) (Banks-Baldwin, 1988), excerpted in McIntyre,
115 S Ct at 1514-15 n 3.
"' The statute also permitted publications "issued by the regularly constituted'central
or executive committee of a political party, organized as provided in Chapter 3517 of the
[Ohio] Revised code," provided that they bore "the name of the committee and its chair-
man or treasurer." Id.
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would be allowed to participate in the public debate. Any associa-
tion of individuals-the "Concerned Parents and Taxpayers," or
the shareholders of "McDonalds, Inc.," or the members of the
Class of 1998 of Blendon Middle School or of the faculty of the
Georgetown University Law Center-was more than welcome to
participate, provided that it first organized itself in such a fash-
ion that it have a "chairman, treasurer or secretary." Only then,
after the relevant information was created, could the second
statutory requirement-that the information in those categories
be disclosed-be applied.
Viewed in this light-as a requirement that certain organiza-
tional formalities be complied with before action under an organi-
zational pseudonym can be taken-the Ohio statute more closely
resembles a species of "corporate law." It is a regulation of the
way that individuals may combine their collective efforts into
organizational forms and take action of various kinds. This may
seem a rather strained reading of this statute, and it is certainly
not the reading that the Court gave to it. But the Court's reading
may simply reflect the fact that the Ohio authorities chose to
prosecute Mrs. McIntyre, the individual caught distributing the
offending leaflets, rather than "Concerned Parents and Taxpay-
ers," the "organization" ostensibly responsible for preparing
them.42
On reflection, we should not be surprised by the close link
between questions regarding regulation of pseudonymous commu-
nication and corporate law (or any other means of regulating
"legal personhood"). Pseudonymity,* after all, is the process by
which nonhuman entities acquire names under which they can
take action, and the body of corporate law is one way that the
legal system controls the recognition of such entities:
[P]hysical human beings are not the only entities
protected at law, nor the only entities that have rights.
42 Had Ohio proceeded against this collective entity (that we may assume had neither
a business address nor a "chairman, treasurer or secretary" within the meaning of the
statute), could the organizational defendant have argued that the statute unconstitution-
ally abridged its freedom of speech by shutting out certain entities from participation in
the public debate? In such a posture, the case would more closely have resembled First
National Bank of Boston v Bellotti, 435 US 765 (1978), in which the Court more directly
confronted the constitutionality of prohibiting certain legally recognized entities from
participating in communicative activities when it struck down a Massachusetts statute
prohibiting any corporation from expending funds "for the purpose of... influencing or
affecting the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other than one materially
affecting any of the property, business, or assets of the corporation." Id at 768.
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And routine doctrines of standing (the analysis of
who-or what-may bring a lawsuit or complain about
an asserted violation of rights) have traditionally com-
prehended more than individual, physical, human be-
ings.
Most obviously, corporations, partnerships, and
associations have substantive rights, and have the pro-
cedural right to bring suit. They also have rights to due
process of law, to have those substantive rights en-
forced. Companies sue, and can be sued; they have
lawyers and can invoke first amendment rights to free
speech. All of this is quite separate, by definition and
intent, from the rights and liabilities of the individual
human beings who jointly own the company.
The law abounds in further examples: we find a
plethora of specific entities with rights and standing to
sue or be sued, and quasi-entities, or procedures which
dispense with the need for the specific real humans who
have the real interest in the lawsuit.43
We are surrounded by pseudonymous communication issued
by fictional beings every day. For example, though we do not
generally think of corporate speech as an example of pseudony-
mous speech, it clearly falls within that category. When I receive
an advertising flyer from my local McDonald's restaurant, identi-
fied only by a prominently placed corporate logo (the familiar
"golden arches"), the message is an "anonymous" one, inasmuch
as it contains no information at all about the identity of the indi-
vidual(s) who may have typed it up, reproduced it, or placed it
under my door. But it is also clearly within the subset of pseud-
onymous messages because the presence of the logo provides a
great deal of information about the recognizable (corporate) enti-
ty responsible for preparing and distributing the flyer.'
The syllogism, then, is as follows: the regulation of anony-
mous communication is inextricably linked to the regulation of
pseudonymous communication; the latter is, in turn, inextricably
' Curtis E. A. Karnow, The Encrypted Self" Fleshing Out the Rights of Electronic
Personalities, 13 John Marshall J Computer & Info L 1, 3 (1994) (cited in note 6). The
classic treatment of these questions is Lon L. Fuller, Legal Fictions (Stanford University
Press, 1967).
" That information may, or may not, be reliable or trustworthy; a competitor may
have forged the McDonald's logo, for example. The reliability of this information is, at
least to some extent, a function of the legal protection afforded to this form of information
through, for example, trademark law.
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linked to the regulation of the varieties of "legal persons" that
the law will recognize, the kinds of collective entities that will (or
will not) be permitted to engage in public discourse or other ac-
tivities; therefore, the regulation of anonymity is inextricably
linked to the determination of which entities the law will recog-
nize and allow to participate in public discourse or other
activiities. In fact, the relationship between pseudonymity and
these latter questions can profitably be extended still further. We
are well acquainted with the notion that some collective entities
("corporations") to which the law grants fictional legal
personhood are formed by the operation of statutory provisions
that limit the liability of the individuals participating in those
entities (shareholders) for the entity's actions. These provisions
allow those individuals to contribute tangible assets to the collec-
tive entity while remaining (relatively) secure in the knowledge
that only those contributions, and not any other of the
individuals' assets, are at risk when the collective entity acts.45
Pseudonymity itself is a means, independent of these statutory
provisions, for achieving much the same limited-liability goal for
participants in collective-communicative activities. By definition,
a pseudonymous communication contains no information about
the identity of the individual(s) truly responsible for the commu-
nication. To the extent-but only to the extent-the communica-
tion is untraceably pseudonymous, damage to or depletion of the
tangible assets belonging to the actual speaker(s) may be avoided
by virtue of the fact that (by definition) there is no feasible way
to identify those speakers. If I am unable to determine the true
identity of the individual or individuals constituting "your friend"
or "Mark Twain" or "Concerned Parents and Taxpayers" (or the
shareholders of "McDonalds, Inc."), I can look no further than
Limited liability, a fundamental principle of corporate law, requires that sharehold-
ers in a corporation are not liable for the obligations of the enterprise beyond the capital
that they contribute in exchange for their shares. See Model Business Corp Act § 6.22(b)
(Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985). Limited liability was not always the rule in American
law. See Stephen B. Presser, Thwarting the Killing of the Corporation: Limited Liability,
Democracy, and Economics, 87 Nw U L Rev 148, 155-56 (1992) (discussing the historical
background of adoption of limited liability statutes); Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability
and Corporate Groups, 11 J Corp L 573, 587-95 (1986) (describing early American law
providing for shareholder liability). However, it has been accepted in most American
jurisdictions since the mid-nineteenth century. Blumberg, 11 J Corp L at 591-95 (limited
,liability was the rule by the middle of the nineteenth century with several exceptions that
continued into the twentieth century). See also Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corpo-
rate Veil: an Empirical Study, 76 Cornell L Rev 1036, 1039 (1991).
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the assets of the entity itself, if any, (or, perhaps, to some third
party) for compensation.
This form of limited liability is also a characteristic, to be
sure, of anonymous speech; indeed it is but a restatement of the
rather obvious point that truly anonymous speakers may avoid
being held accountable for any harms arising from their speech.
But pseudonymity brings potentially offsetting benefits into play:
by serving as storehouses of reputational capital, pseudonymous
entities add value to social interaction in a way that anonymous
speech does not.46 It is on the nature of that additional value, I
suggest, that we need to focus our attention if we are to intelli-
gently regulate anonymity in cyberspace. In the corporate con-
text, society adopted limited liability as a conscious strategy to
encourage the pooling of physical and financial assets and to
induce individuals to take socially useful collective action. In
cyberspace, the same considerations should inform the extent to
which we protect pseudonymous communication. That is, any
regulation should be informed by the social benefits that these
pseudonymous entities produce and the extent to which this form
of limited liability is required to induce "investors" (participants
in these pseudonymous entities) to pool their intellectual capital
into such entities.
Even given my initial assumption-conceding a heightened
potential for harm from truly anonymous speech in the special
circumstances of cyberspace47 -our understanding of the overall
balance between costs and benefits of a ban on anonymity is not
complete until we examine the effect that this ban may have on
the formation of collective pseudonymously speaking entities. A
simple ban on anonymity (such as the one the hypothetical Ohio
legislature has tried to impose) denies us the benefits that may
be gained from the activities of entities of this kind; a more nu-
anced approach may enable us to capture at least some of those
4 See Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation, 28 Buff L Rev 1, 31
(1979) ("Reputation has an important economic function in a market system (or in any
system where voluntary interactions are important). It reduces the search costs of buyers
and sellers, makes it easier for the superior producer to increase his sales relative to
those of inferior ones, and in these ways helps channel resources into their most valuable
employments-a process at the heart of the market system. This role is not limited to ex-
plicit markets; it is just as vital to the functioning of the 'marriage market,' the market in
friends, the political market, and so on."). See also Elmer William Hanak, III, The Quality
Assurance Function of Trademarks, 43 Fordham L Rev 363, 364 (1974); William M.
Landes and Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J L & Econ
265 (1987).
" See notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
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benefits while simultaneously minimizing the harms attendant
on an anonymous messaging system. Corporation law has a long
history of attempting to strike that balance, and I propose that
we begin developing a form of corporate law for cyberspace, rules
regarding the formation of these entities and the protections that
they will be afforded, in order to competently address the (seem-
ingly unrelated) question of the regulation of anonymous speech.
We need, in other words, to ask a series of questions about our
hypothetical ban on anonymity that have little (if anything) to do
with the continued existence of anonymous remailers or the me-
chanics of chained encryption. Are the kinds of collective entities
that can be formed in cyberspace sufficiently valuable that we
should induce individuals to form them by offering limited liabili-
ty? If so, how might our rules regarding traceability be fashioned
to maximize those benefits? In what contexts should we allow, or
require, any form of "piercing the pseudonymity veil" (and how
might we ensure that the information required to perform that
operation is available)?
Designing limited-liability/pseudonymity rules for cyberspace
will probably be no easier than designing them for the nonvirtual
world, where there is something of a "consensus that the whole
area of limited liability, and conversely of piercing the corporate
veil, is among the most confusing in corporate law."4 Many
commentators have suggested abandoning limited liability in the
corporate context altogether; others have come to its defense on
assorted grounds.49 I will content myself with the following ob-
servations regarding what I believe to be some of the features
that this analysis will require.
First, it seems plausible to assert that the unique character-
istics of cyberspace so enhance individuals' ability to pool their
"' Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corpora-
tion, 52 U Chi L Rev 89, 89 (1985). See also Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theo-
ries of the Corporation, 50 Md L Rev 80, 81 (1991) (declaring limited liability to be "one of
the most controversial issues in corporate law"); Henry Hansmann and Reiner Kraakman,
Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 Yale L J 1879, 1931
(1991) (criticizing the doctrinal boundaries between limited liability and veil-piercing
theory as "vague and largely unprincipled"); Thompson, 76 Cornell L Rev at 1037 (1991)
(cited in note 45) ("Piercing the corporate veil is the most litigated issue in corporate law
and yet it remains among the least understood"); Phillip J. Blumberg, The Law of Cor-
porate Groups: Procedural Problems in the Law of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations
§ 1.02 at 8 (Little, Brown & Co., 1983) (noting the plethora of "irreconcilable and not
entirely comprehensible" decisions in this area and that "[flew areas of the law have been
so sharply criticized by commentators").
" These arguments are summarized in Thompson, 76 Cornell L Rev at 1039-1043
(cited in note 45).
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intellectual capital into entities of this kind that the benefits to
be gained by allowing and encouraging these forms of intellectual
undertakings are likely to be substantial. One of the ways in
which cyberspace differs from the nonvirtual world is precisely
the remarkable and astonishing ease with which collective enti-
ties of various kinds-some of which look like little that we have
previously encountered--can be formed; there are, at present, no
registration requirements, no forms that need to be filled out, no
approval that needs to be obtained, in order to call these entities
into existence. The fundamental characteristic of cyberspace is
that it is a network (or, more properly, a network of networks);
everyone in cyberspace is connected to everyone else through the
magic of interconnectivity protocols" and can communicate in-
stantaneously on a one-to-one, one-to-many, many-to-one, or
many-to-many basis with a constantly shifting (but enormous)
population of other individuals. In the space of an afternoon, I
can join a dozen (or a hundred) ongoing associations by subscrib-
ing to individual listservers or Usenet discussion groups, form a
dozen new such associations myself with a few lines of code in-
serted in my Internet Service Provider's system, and set up a
dozen aliases on my provider's mail system through which I can
communicate (and invite friends and colleagues to help me for-
mulate the messages that will go out under each of these alias-
es)."' Fictitious entities of this kind, speaking through pseud-
'o The best known of which is, of course, the Internet Protocol suite. See Henry H.
Perritt, Jr., What is the Internet?, http://www.law.vill.edu/ucilp/technotes/whatis5.html
(1995); John S. Quarterman, The Matrix: Computer Networks and Conferencing Systems
Worldwide 47-55 (Digital Press, 1990); E. Krol and E. Hoffman, What is the Internet?
Internet Engineering Task Force RFC 1462 at 6 (1993) (available online at
http://ds.internic.net/ds/rfc-index.1400-1499.html); Andy Reinhardt, Building the Data
Highway, 19 BYTE 46, 70-72 (1994); Carl Malamud, Exploring the Internet: A Technical
Travelogue (Prentice Hall, 1993); John S. Quarterman and Josiah C. Hoskins, Notable
Computer Networks, 29 Communications of the ACM 932, 932-42 (Oct 1986).
" See Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 Yale L J 1805, 1833-
43 (1995). I have described this phenomenon of low-cost association building in the con-
text of the ongoing battles in cyberspace between the Church of Scientology and some of
its critics over alleged unlawful postings of copyrighted and trade secret material:
[RIelations between [Scientology's] adherents and critics have never been
pleasant; passions run feverishly high on both sides, and the Scientologists have
often been accused of dealing, shall we say, rather harshly with their critics.
But at least until July 17, 1991, there was no truly organized opposition to
the Scientologists's teachings and tactics, no true community of the disaffected.
How could there be? Building an anti-church, after all, takes just about as much
administrative and operational savvy, not to mention money, as does building a
church. But that feature of the landscape changed dramatically on the date
mentioned, when a Scientology critic, Scott Goehring, formed a discussion
POOLING INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL
onyms, are ubiquitous in cyberspace, a remarkable feature of the
new landscape that is sometimes taken for granted.52 Two (or
more) heads are-surely in some circumstances at least-better
than one. The prospect for more creative uses of this ability for
individuals to pool their intellectual capital with great flexibility
and with a minimum of start-up or transaction costs into a wide
range of new kinds of actors and entities-what Howard
Rheingold has called "grassroots groupmind"5 -- each capable of
establishing a unique identity and accumulating its own specific
reputational capital, is a profound and exciting feature of cyberspace.'
group--"alt.religion.scientology'--on what is called the "Usenet" network portion
of the Internet .... Suddenly, in the 30 seconds or so that it took Goehring to
type out his request, and the $0.05 or so it cost him to transmit that message to
the computers responsible for Usenet network configuration, there is a place
where the disgruntled can meet to exchange ideas and information-a new com-
munity, one of the literally hundreds of thousands of such communities that
have sprung into being on the Internet over the past few years.
David Post, The First Internet War: Scientology, Its Critics, Anarchy, and Law in
Cyberspace, Reason 28 (Apr 1996) (cited in note 29). We may often describe a Usenet
group such as alt.religion.scientology as a "place," as I have in the above excerpt; but it
may also properly be considered a "person" or an "association" consisting of its members
at any given time.
5 The use of "screen names" on commercial online services is virtually universal, and
though we often assume that there is one individual standing behind each such name,
that assumption is usually just that-an assumption-without any particular foundation.
For example, as noted above, the ideas in this paper were developed during a number of
online discussions with "Perry the Cynic," [perry@cynic.org]; I have not been able to
confirm that this is, or is not, a single individual.
' Howard Rheingold, The Virtual Community ch 4 (Addison-Wesley, 1993) ("[Glroups
of people are using [computer-mediated communication] to rediscover the power of cooper-
ation, turning cooperation into a game, a way of life-a merger of knowledge capital,
social capital, and communion. The fact that we need computer networks to recapture the
sense of cooperative spirit that so many people seemed to lose when we gained all this
technology is a painful irony.").
' My favorite example of this phenomenon is the Cancelmoose, a fictitious being
operating pseudonymously in cyberspace that has taken a lead in issuing
"cancelbots"--commands that cancel postings to Usenet newsgroups-in response to
reported instances of "spamming" (bombarding numerous newsgroups with copies of the
same message). One answer to the question "Who is Cancelmoose[tm]?" is provided in the
Frequently Asked Question ("FAQ") file for the Usenet newsgroup news.admin.net-abuse
(Nov 15, 1995 version) (available online at http.//www.smartpages.com/faqs/net-abuse-
faq/partl/faq.html and http:/www.smartpages.com/faqs/net-abuse/faq/part2/faq.html).
Cancelmoose[tm] is, to misquote some wise poster, "the greatest public servant
the net has seen in quite some time." Once upon a time, the moose would send
out spam-cancels and then post notices anonymously to news.admin.policy,
news.admin.misc, and a.c-e.n-a. The Moose stepped to the fore on its own initia-
tive, at a time (mid 1994) when spam-cancels were irregular and disorganized,
and behaved altogether admirably-fair, even-handed, and quick to respond to
comments and criticism, all without self-aggrandizement or martyrdom.
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There is a "democratizing" impulse at work here, a relatively
sudden increase in each individual cyberspace citizen's ability to
participate in public collective action without formalities or legal
barriers of any kind. Just as the doctrine of corporate limited lia-
bility itself developed as a means of encouraging individual en-
trepreneurial participation in the economic life of the nation,5
so too should the benefits of these new forms of public participa-
tion be weighed carefully before adopting any regulation of ano-
nymity.56 The question is not whether there are costs associated
with the activities of these entities (for surely there are), nor
whether those costs could be lowered by imposing a stringent
traceability regime denying all participants in these entities the
liability shield of pseudonymity (for that, too, is clear). The ques-
Cancelmoose[tm]. quickly gained near-unanimous support from the readership of
all three above-mentioned groups. Nobody knows who Cancelmoose[tm] really is,
and there aren't really even any good rumors. However, the moose now has an
e-mail address (moose@cm.org) and a web site (http://www.cm.org.).
See Benjamin Wittes, Law in Cyberspace: Witnessing the Birth of a Legal System on the
Net, Legal Times S27-29 (Jan 23, 1995) (describing Cancelmoose as "widely seen not as a
censor but as an enforcer of the accepted rules of Usenet .... Cancelmoose is a fascinating
example of the Net's self-government because of the care he takes to avoid going beyond
the community's consensus on which cancels are legitimate. He posts a justification for
each of his cancels on a newsgroup devoted to net abuse, including in that justification a
copy of the original message and a list of the newsgroups from which the spain was re-
moved. He also includes information allowing sysops to override the cancels....
Cancelmoose also takes pains to emphasize that the content of messages does not influ-
ence his decision whether or not to cancel them."); Kevin M. Savetz, Terminators: Net
Guardians are Launching Cancelbots to Devour Unpalatable Spam, Internet World 80
(June 1995). Cancelmoose has also been described as an "Internet terrorist," "the first
lawman of the electronic frontier," see Katz, Snapshots: Moose on Loose, The Guardian 8
(Dec 22, 1994), and, interestingly, as "a hacker's program," see Todd Copilevitz, Imposter
Using Internet to Make Author's Life Miserable, Dallas Morning News 5A (Dec 21, 1994).
Whether the Cancelmoose is a single person, a collective entity acting under the name of
Cancelmoose, or lines of code-a "hacker's program" designed to take action against par-
ticular kinds of spamning incidents-is, as far as I am aware, not known and may well be
unknowable given today's technology (and the absence of Net-wide rules governing the
obligation to disclose personal identity). Whatever it may be, it has, of course, its own
home page. See http://www.cm.org.
"' See Presser, 87 Nw U L Rev at 155-156 (cited in note 45);" Stephen B. Presser,
Piercing the Corporate Veil § 1.03 at 1-14 (Clark Boardman Callaghan, 1993); Paul
Halpern, Michael Trebikock, and Stuart Turnbull, An Economic Analysis of Limited
Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U Toronto L J 117, 118-19 (1980) (discussing the ar-
guments in support of limited liability in England regarding its expected effects on the
"investments of savings by the middle and working classes").
' See Froomkin, Flood Control at 4 (cited in note 4) (discussing the Internet as a
"radically democratizing tool"). See also Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social
Dialogue on the' Information Superhighway: the Case Against Copyright Liability of
Bulletin Board Operators, 13 Cardozo Arts & Enter L J 345, 399-411 (1995) (cited in note
22).
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tion is, rather, whether we may need to bear those costs in order
to reap the benefits from these "groupmind" activities. I have no
answer to this question, but such considerations surely should
give us pause when confronted with any effort to eliminate ano-
nymity-and, by extension, pseudonymity-in cyberspace.
Second, we should be particularly solicitous of mechanisms
in cyberspace that, like pseudonymous speech, can serve as vehi-
cles for investment in reputational capital. Cyberspace resembles
a "state of nature" in many respects, notably in the absence of
effective centralized mechanisms for the enforcement of legal
rules.57 As Rubin has persuasively argued, in such an environ-
ment institutions that allow "firms" (that is, collective entities of
various kinds) to accumulate and protect reputational capital are
of paramount importance."
" The notion of the "state of nature," of course, dates back at least to Hobbes. See
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 100, 108 (Macmillan Publishing Co., 1962) (originally pub-
lished in 1651) ("[Dluring the time men live without a common power to keep them all in
awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man,
against every man .... If a covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties perform
presently, but trust one another; in the condition of mere nature .... it is void: but if
there be a common power set over them both, with right and force sufficient to compel
performance, it is not void."). See also Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and the State
of Nature, 1 J L Econ & Organization 5, 6-9 (1985) (defining the state of nature between
two parties as the situation "[wihen two individuals (or groups) exchange promises and
neither has the power to compel the other to perform, and there is also no third party
powerful enough to enforce the agreement on their behalf"). The global nature of the
electronic networks constituting cyberspace and the absence of a "common power to keep
[participants] in awe" make it plausible to suggest that cyberspace has many features
that resemble the state of nature. See Post, Reason at 28 (cited in note 29).
Rubin writes:
[P]rivate mechanisms for solving the problems associated with opportunism in
transactions [are] limited in their power; they cannot achieve an optimum.
Without efficient government enforcement, it will be impossible to realize all
potential gains from trade .... On the other hand, it is possible to underesti-
mate the power of such [private] mechanisms.... In a world where trade is
legal but contracts are not enforced,... reputations can become public knowl-
edge, giving much more power to these [private] mechanisms.... There are
three classes of private mechanisms to make agreements credible. All three rely
on reputations.
Paul H. Rubin, Growing a Legal System in the Post-Communist Economies, 27 Cornell Intl
L J 1, 17-18 (1994). The importance of reputation for facilitating social interaction in envi-
ronments of this kind has led some commentators to call for enhanced protection for
trademark rights in cyberspace. See Dan L. Burk, Trademarks Along the Infobahn: A
First Look at the Emerging Law of Cybermarks, 1 U Richmond J L & Tech 1, 9 69 (1995)
(available online at httpJ/www.urich.edu/-jolt/vlillburk.html) (cited in note 28). Others
have suggested the possibility of closely related "moral" rights of attribution and integrity.
See Mark A. Lemiey, Rights of Attribution and Integrity in Online Communications, 1995
J Online L art 2 9 21-30 (available online at http'//www.law.cornell.edu/jol/jol.table.html)
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Note also that pseudonymity limits participants' liability in
another way: speaking through an untraceable pseudonym
shields the intangible personal assets of the speaker or speak-
ers-their own private reputations and the constellation of per-
sonal characteristics associated with their true identities-from
any damage resulting from the action of the pseudonymous enti-
ty. The storehouse of intangible reputational capital of that enti-
ty--"Publius," for example-may become depleted without any
effect on Alexander Hamilton's reputation, and vice versa.
One characteristic of reputational capital and the privacy
interests that may be affected by disclosure of individual identity
is that the value of these interests for the individual is not easily
transferable to third parties. For example, it may not be possible
to use the reputational capital of the individual participants in a
pseudonymous entity to compensate someone who was harmed by
that entity's actions. If you have been harmed by the actions
taken by, say, the pseudonymous entity Cancelmoose, disclosure
that Cancelmoose is actually Johan Helsingius (the proprietor of
a well.known anonymous remailer in Finland) and Mother
Teresa, acting in concert, will not, standing alone, compensate
you for that harm.
Disclosure may, however, damage the reputational capital
that those two individuals can draw upon in their other efforts,
and it may persuade others that the risk of participating in en-
terprises of this kind is not worth the possible cost to their own
reputations or privacy interests, but those costs are not paid over
to you as the aggrieved party. In some circumstances, of course,
this information may be instrumental in obtaining compensation
by allowing you to locate the responsible actors and to proceed
against them as individuals. In other circumstances, however,
this information will not lead to compensation,5 9 and the loss of
value associated with the disclosure of this information is not
matched by any corresponding gain to the aggrieved party.
Protecting the valuable "limited liability" features of
pseudonymity need not, however, mean that harms imposed on
third parties by pseudonymous entities must go unredressed. The
(cited in note 6). These suggestions closely parallel Rubin's call for such protection in the
context of the newly emerging Eastern European democracies. Rubin, 27 Cornell Intl L J
at 35-36 (MThe most important assistance governments can give to private fmns to create
reputation capital is a willingness to enforce trademark property rights.").
" If, for example, you are unable to obtain jurisdiction over the individual partici-
pants whose identities have been revealed, or there is no cause of action for the harm you
have suffered under the laws of the jurisdiction in which they are located.
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need to protect both third parties and the individuals that make
up pseudonymous entities calls for an exploration of alternative
traceability rules" that perhaps can be drawn carefully to maxi-
mize the likelihood of compensating victims of unlawful con-
duct-such as third party insurance or bonding requirements
that allow redress to be achieved without exposing participants'
personal identities to risk6 -while simultaneously minimizing
the losses that may be attendant upon disclosure.
CONCLUSION
There have, up to now, been few steps to regulate anony-
mous speech in cyberspace-indeed, it is unclear how one would
implement and enforce such regulation-but attempts to take
such steps are surely on the horizon. The harms attendant on
anonymous speech are often more easily recognized and more
spectacular62 than the sometimes subtle benefits it may produce.
Having begun this Article with reference to calls for the regu-
lation of the availability of anonymous speech in cyberspace, I
' Because of the key role that rules regarding intermediary liability play and will
play in cyberspace, see note 22, and the critical importance of traceability in determining
whether pseudonymity plays an effective role in limiting liability, see notes 28-30, 36-37
and accompanying text, it is likely that whatever regulation is imposed in an attempt to
control anonymous or pseudonymous communications will be imposed on network inter-
mediaries through, for example, rules regarding their duty (a) to collect verifiable identify-
ing information from subscribers, (b) to turn over that information in specified circum-
stances, and (c) to refuse to carry communications that come from systems that do not
abide by similar traceability rules.
"' This is equivalent to a corporate law with a "minimum capitalization" requirement
but without a corresponding absolute right to inspect shareholder lists. Nearly all states
give shareholders some right to inspect corporate records, which may include the share-
holder list, upon proper showing of need. See, for example, 8 Del Code Ann § 220(b) (1994)
(providing that any stockholder shall have the right to "inspect for any proper purpose"
the corporation's list of stockholders, and defining "proper purpose" as "a purpose reason-
ably related to such person's interests as a stockholder"); Model Bus Corp Act § 16.02(c)
(Prentice Hall Law & Business, 1991) (allowing inspection of the shareholder list if the in-
specting shareholder makes his demand "in good faith and for a proper purpose" and
shows that the records are "directly connected with this purpose"); Cal Corp Code § 1600
(West Supp 1986) (providing that shareholders holding at least 5 percent in the aggregate
of the outstanding voting shares of a corporation have "an absolute right" to inspect and
copy the record of shareholders' names and addresses). See also SEC Rule 14a-7, 17 CFR
§ 240.14a-7(a) (1995), under which a shareholder, subject to some restraints, may require
the corporation engaged in a proxy solicitation to choose either to provide a shareholder
list to the shareholder or to mail the shareholder's soliciting materials, if any, to other
shareholders (at the shareholder's expense).
' The day surely will come when law enforcement authorities report that a serious
crime was planned by means of anonymous electronic communication. It is equally certain
that the popular press will react with horror, and that calls for a prohibition on this kind
of activity will intensify.
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have ended with a call for the development of a corporate law for
cyberspace as a means to accomplish that regulation in a reason-
able manner. This connection has been made before, in a differ-
ent context and on the basis of different considerations. Curtis
Karnow, for example, has suggested recognizing a new corporate
entity in cyberspace, the e-person:
The corporation was molded to its modern form by
extraordinary developments in trade and economics. I
suggest the extraordinary developments in technology,
and specifically the information, or digital, revolution,
gives rise to a new legal entity: the electronic persona.
The new entity is bred between the anvil of free
flow of information, and the hammer of security and
privacy. As with the development of the corporate form,
the central function of the new legal entity is simulta-
neously to (i) provide access to a new means of commu-
nal or economic interaction, and (ii) shield the physical,
individual human being from certain types of liability or
exposure.63
For Karnow, legal recognition for e-persons is intimately connect-
ed with assuring privacy for those who act in cyberspace;' I
Curtis E. A. Karnow, The Encrypted Self- Fleshing Out the Rights of Electronic
Personalities, 13 John Marshall J Computer & Info L 1, 4 (1994) (cited in note 6).
' Karnow writes:
Rights are conferred on epers for the same reason they are conferred on humans
in the physical world: because there are powerful forces that we wish to re-
strain; and we cannot restrain those forces with countervailing raw power. We
need a consensus that such raw power shall not ipso facto have its way....
[Elpers must be allowed some room, so that literal ownership of (i) the means of
communication and (ii) agglutinated information does not thereby confer rights
with respect to the content of the communication and the dissemination of the
information....
[Elpers are most useful when we need to communicate but still need a
shield: when we want to maintain intact the ramified divisions of our social and
economic lives. For privacy is not truly a matter of an absolute barricade; it is
instead inhibiting the spillover of information from one place to another....
Here we find the central contribution of the eper .... Epers can provide the ano-
nymity that this compelled exposure would destroy. Multiple epers can conduct
business and-this is the point-keep information segregated. Epers are related
only through the human progenitor, and that link can be encrypted. In a uni-
verse of utterly accessible mutating data, epers help ensure both access and
privacy.
Id at 11-13. See also Mark A. Lemley, Rights of Attribution and Integrity in Online Com-
munications, 1995 J Online L art 2 $ 40 (available online at
POOLING INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL
have tried to suggest that these e-persons have another role to
play-facilitating collective action and creating reputational capi-
tal. E-persons have already begun to speak and act in online
communities, notwithstanding (or, more likely, precisely because
of) the fact that the legal system has paid them little mind, and
we have only begun to understand the form that they may take
or the values that they may embody-or the harms that they
may cause. But we surely need to tread lightly in this area lest
we, perhaps unintentionally, disturb the development of these
most intriguing and potentially valuable arrangements.
httpJ/www.law.cornell.edu/jol/jol.table.html) (cited in note 6) (discussing the need to pro-
tect pseudonymously named e-persons in order to protect the "virtual community" from
damage).
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